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1 Introduction 
Our previous submission in response to the Report and Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making (FCC 07-72, 27 April 2007) presented economic analysis that supports 
Frontline’s proposal that a national license for the E Block of the 700 MHz band should mandate 
open access. Open access means that  
(1)  wholesale contracting is transparent and nondiscriminatory, and  
(2)  there is neither exclusion nor discrimination among devices and communications 
that conform to the licensee’s published standards and operating protocols. 
The motivation is straightforward. Extending to the wireless sphere the huge gains to 
communication and commerce of the wireline Internet will greatly benefit the American public. 
The creation of the Wireless Internet requires an open network comparable to the wireline 
network that has made the Internet so beneficial. The 700 MHz auction is the Commission’s 
main opportunity to give the public the full benefits of wireless services from competitive 
providers of digital telephony, internet connections, and broadband.  
This paper extends the economic analysis by addressing claims from opponents of this open 
access proposal.  We argue that the current state of the wireless market, and the potential for 
improving consumer welfare, justify the following conclusions:  
•  Open access for the E Block is necessary and will improve the efficiency of the auction 
outcome. Further, it is essential to address open access in this proceeding. The open-
access and wholesale provisions for the E Block are narrowly-tailored remedies and fully 
consistent with the Commission’s goals.  
•  There is an important market failure in auctions with dominant incumbents. Auction rules 
that level the playing field between incumbents and new entrants are necessary to assure 
efficient assignment of the licenses. In particular, the previous AWS auction of high-
frequency spectrum was not comparable to the upcoming 700 MHz auction of low-
frequency spectrum. If the AWS auction rules are used for the 700 MHz auction then 
incumbents can block entry and consolidate their dominant positions. 
In the next section we justify these conclusions in the context of our replies to others’ comments. 
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  12  Responses to open access opponents’ claims 
This section explains why the points listed in the Introduction are true, contrary to claims 
made by some opponents of the open access proposal. It also explains why opposition serves the 
narrow interests of incumbents rather than the public welfare. 
2.1  The open-access requirement on the E Block is necessary to obtain an 
efficient auction outcome  
As we explained in detail in our previous comments, the wireless market is highly 
concentrated and on a path towards even greater concentration that could eventually justify 
antitrust actions. Indeed, the concentration level is well above levels that normally trigger 
antitrust scrutiny in merger situations were it not for the FCC’s pre-emption of regulation in 
communication industries. Such concentration can harm consumers in general, and it is 
especially noxious when incumbent firms can stifle innovative entry straightforwardly in 
auctions conducted by the FCC. Their exclusions of roaming and selected devices and 
communications could be interpreted as vertical foreclosure. 
Two firms, Verizon and AT&T, now control much of the access to the low-frequency 
spectrum in the 800 MHz range. Low-frequency spectrum is necessary for low-cost nationwide 
coverage and robust service. It allows these two firms to charge higher prices and yet have lower 
churn rates and a higher share of new subscriptions. The financial interests of these two 
companies are to exclude access by any provider of retail wireless services that might capture 
market share by competing against their own retail arms and dependent affiliates.  
The Wireless Internet can be a source of great benefits to customers. It will greatly improve 
the efficiency of the markets for communication services, which is the most important policy 
goal of the Commission. The benefits are likely to accrue mostly to consumers and reduce 
incumbents’ profits. Therefore, the Commission cannot realistically hope that any incumbent 
will create the Wireless Internet on its own initiative. Hence the Commission must act in the 
interest of the consumers to designate the E Block for open access and to sell the right to build 
and operate it to the highest bidder. 
Consumer welfare has been enhanced by the introduction and expansion of mobile wireless 
services. But the absolute level of consumers’ gain is not the appropriate metric—instead it 
should be measured against the gain in consumer welfare that is possible. The introduction of 
additional competition—competition engendered by an open access E block—can accelerate and 
magnify the gains in consumer welfare from wireless services. It is this opportunity that the 
Commission risks missing were it to allow the incumbents to forestall entry in the 700 MHz 
auction. 
2.2  There is an important market failure in spectrum auctions with dominant 
incumbents 
Some opponents of open access argue that selling a license with no restrictions to the highest 
bidder should result in the most efficient assignment of the spectrum.
2 Subject to various 
qualifiers, this view can sometimes be a valid guide when all potential bidders are on equal 
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  2footing. But it is severely wrong when some bidders are new entrants and some are incumbents 
motivated to protect their market shares.  
The reason is that entrants and incumbents have very different motives. A new entrant’s 
incentive is to maximize its profits from the license alone, while an incumbent maximizes the 
sum of its profits from the combination of its existing licenses and new licenses. When its 
existing profits would be threatened by a new entrant, an incumbent is willing to pay more for a 
new license to prevent competition than any entrant would pay for the license.  
  To gain market share, an entrant prices services on its newly acquired spectrum to 
undercut the incumbents’ prices. Customers benefit from this downward pressure on 
prices due to increased competition. To gain further market share, a new entrant also 
wants to offer technical innovations valued by customers.  
  In contrast, an incumbent realizes that any competing service offered on the new 
spectrum steals business from its existing retail service plans. Hence it has muted 
incentives to offer lower prices or new technologies that compete with its existing 
offerings. To prevent losing business to new competitors and being forced to reduce 
prices, an incumbent is willing to pay a premium to acquire the spectrum—and the 
larger its current market share, the larger is the premium it is willing to pay. It is 
crucial to realize that under these circumstances, even though an incumbent values 
winning the license more than an entrant does, that additional valuation does not 
represent true value added, but rather the incremental value of thwarting competition 
from entrants.  
This is why allowing bidders with large market shares to compete on equal terms with 
entrants yields an allocation that is distorted away from an efficient allocation. Equal competition 
among unequal bidders is biased toward those with market shares to protect. The resulting 
allocation is inefficient in that it displaces entrants who could otherwise have invigorated 
competition and thus lowered prices to consumers.  
2.3  Auction rules that level the field between incumbents and new entrants are 
necessary to assure the most efficient assignment of licenses 
To enable an efficient assignment of the new spectrum, the Commission cannot take a 
hands-off approach to the design of the service and auction rules. In the early spectrum auctions 
a spectrum cap prevented each cellular duopolist from obtaining additional licenses in its cellular 
regions. Comparable intervention is needed now to prevent the current low-frequency carriers 
from capturing the 700 MHz spectrum to solidify their dominant positions. Because the spectrum 
cap that the FCC established before the PCS auctions was removed, the chief remaining 
instruments available now focus on exclusion of the 800 MHz licensees and/or bidding credits 
for small businesses. Measures of this kind are necessary lest the 800 MHz duopoly is extended 
to the 700 MHz spectrum to fully and permanently consolidate their dominance. By enabling 
entrants to compete effectively in the auction, bidding credits for small businesses encourage an 
assignment of the licenses that is more efficient and ultimately more beneficial to consumers.  
This conclusion accords with the argument for restrictions on the E Block license. 
Nondiscriminatory wholesale contracts for open access to the E Block licensee’s network level 
the field for regional licensees and retailers who compete in retail markets with the retail arms of 
the incumbents’ nationwide vertically integrated proprietary networks.  
  32.4  It is important to create the Wireless Internet now, not in separate 
proceedings after the auction 
Some parties want the open access and Carterfone issues to be addressed in other 
proceedings, and thus they argue that Commission should not address them separately for this 
auction.
3  We disagree: it is essential to address open access and other provisions of the E Block 
license in this proceeding.  
The Commission cannot readily impose open access on selected licenses after the license 
assignment and the licenses’ prices have been previously determined by an auction process 
conducted without the bidders’ knowing the service rules that will ultimately prevail. A decision 
before the auction allows the two business models (open-access and proprietary vertically 
integrated networks) to compete in the auction and subsequently to co-exist and compete for 
customers. It is better policy to establish the licenses’ specifications before the auction, to allow 
firms competing in the auction to assess their valuations without uncertainty about the future 
outcomes of additional proceedings.  
2.5  The AWS auction is not an appropriate analogy for the upcoming 700 MHz 
auction, and it did not perform as well as some commenters argue 
Dr. Hazlett in his paper “Competition, Auction Receipts and Economic Welfare” submitted 
on behalf of Verizon in response to the Notice states that the recent AWS auction attracted 
competitive bidding and no anti-competitive behavior by the incumbents. His supposition that 
there is an analogy between the AWS auction and the 700 MHz auction is incorrect. The AWS 
auction allocated very different spectrum—high-frequency spectrum that is not economical for 
development of a robust nationwide network that could compete with the coverage of existing 
networks in the 800 MHz band. The AWS auction did not allow any entrant to challenge the 
position of AT&T and Verizon as the two leading firms with the requisite low-frequency 
spectrum that is necessary for developing nationwide products. Nor did it create a major threat to 
the duopoly rents that they earn from their exclusive holds on licenses for low-frequency 
spectrum.  
The situation is very different in the upcoming auction of 700 MHz spectrum. The 700 MHz 
auction is not “just another auction”. It will assign spectrum with physical properties greatly 
superior to the PCS and AWS spectrum, and indeed, directly comparable to the incumbents’ 800 
MHz spectrum. The 700 MHz auction is a unique opportunity to prevent entrenchment of the 
dominant positions of the current incumbents. The FCC should ensure that new entrants have a 
chance to pursue their business plans and that the “incumbent bias” of auctions described in 
Section 2.2 does not yield an inefficient allocation of this precious spectrum. 
Moreover, the view that the AWS auction was a boon for competition is not correct. In 
reality, the participation of one new entrant with a nationwide strategy was hampered by the 
auction rules. The DBS bidders dropped out of the auction when the total of the prices for 
nationwide coverage by aggregating smaller blocks was evidently well below their willingness to 
pay. We say this based on the DBS bidders’ actual bids for large regional licenses, which might 
also have reflected discounts from their willingness to pay for nationwide coverage because of 
exposure risk (as we explained in our previous filing). It is impossible to say whether the DBS 
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  4bidders would have been successful with different auction rules, but one can say that the AWS 
auction rules frustrated the participation of this potential nationwide entrant.  
Given that vastly more is at stake for AT&T and Verizon in the auction of the 700MHz 
spectrum, it is clear that if the Commission does not level the playing field then these two firms 
will have both incentive and ability to discourage new competition in wireless markets at the 
national level. 
2.6  The open access provisions for the E Block are narrowly tailored remedies, 
fully consistent with the Commission’s goals 
Some parties before the Commission argue that the open-access provisions are heavy-
handed regulation and contrary to the Commission’s goals. We disagree with both parts of this 
statement. Rather than being heavy-handed, the proposal asks for a modest restriction on a single 
10 MHz block out of the 78 MHz of spectrum licensed for commercial use in the 700 MHz band 
and no restrictions on the other low-frequency CMRS spectrum. This restriction is no more than 
minimally necessary to assure open access on nondiscriminatory terms. Without it America will 
likely never see open access. 
Any decision the Commission makes about the service and auction rules is ultimately a 
decision about the structure of the market for decades to come. Extreme concentration of the 
low-frequency spectrum in the hands of two firms sets the stage for continued domination by 
these two companies, unless the FCC takes action now.  
Imposing modest restrictions on the E Block license is much less intrusive than the two main 
alternatives: a) endorsing continued domination of the low-frequency spectrum by Verizon and 
AT&T’s vertically integrated proprietary networks, or b) requiring open access on all spectrum 
by requiring mandatory roaming at regulated rates. The provisions of the E Block license are 
confined to the minimal requirements for open access on nondiscriminatory terms. This is the 
least intrusive of the ways the Commission can establish an infrastructure for wireless 
communication that is not controlled and manipulated by firms with a chokehold on nearly every 
aspect of America’s digital technology. 
The Commission’s goal is to allocate spectrum, a very scarce and valuable resource, to its 
highest and best use as measured by the public welfare. This outcome will not be achieved by 
selling the 700 MHz spectrum without restrictions to the 800 MHz incumbents, whose high 
valuations stem from their incentives to protect their current profits by stifling competition rather 
than creating value added for the public.  
Lastly, we add that the effect on the Treasury’s revenue of the E Block provisions is much 
less than the incumbents argue in their comments, and under some scenarios may generate higher 
bids. Establishment of the Wireless Internet will make all the regional licenses more valuable 
and hence it will increase the revenue from auctioning other blocks. Further, if the Commission 
chooses to take no action and adopts rules that perpetuate the incumbents’ dominant positions, 
then the auction will likely be over before it starts—if potential bidders expect the incumbents to 
win then there will be little competition and low revenue for the Treasury. Evidence from many 
European countries has shown clearly that auction prices were much lower when incumbents 
could acquire all 3G licenses than when the auction rules guaranteed a level field for new entry.
4  
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  5Given the dramatic evidence from Europe’s sad experience, there is no excuse for repeating such 
a mistake in the upcoming auction of 700 MHz spectrum. Importantly, similar rules worked well 
in some countries’ auctions and terribly in others’ auctions—what did matter was the 
incumbents’ ability in the auction to dwarf competition from potential entrants. The erroneous 
expectation that the same rules—closely comparable to those for the FCC’s auction of PCS 
spectrum—will work well for many different auctions with differing competitive environments, 
was a major mistake in the designs used in Europe. In several countries the unexpectedly small 
revenues brought dismay at the relevant Treasury departments. 
3 Conclusion 
We see the Commission having three main alternatives: a) do nothing and thus continue the 
dominance of the vertically integrated incumbents, b) enforce open access on all spectrum by 
imposing service rules requiring nondiscriminatory terms for roaming on all spectrum, or c) 
establish an open-access license on a slice of the 700 MHz spectrum to create room for both 
business structures to co-exist and to compete for customers on price, quality and variety.  
We stress that the last alternative is available only now, in the band plan, service rules, and 
auction design for the licenses to be sold in the upcoming auction of 700 MHz spectrum. It is 
also the propitious moment for extending to wireless services the advantages of the Internet. We 
believe that the dire situation implied by (a) and the heavy-handed intervention implied by (b) 
can be avoided with minimal intervention by the Commission. Applying pro-competitive open 
access rules to just a single slice of the 700 MHz spectrum leaves most of the spectrum available 
for other business plans. The E Block license provides the nation a minimal public infrastructure 
for wireless communication, one comparable to the wireline Internet that has yielded vast 
benefits. 
If an open access license is not created then thereafter the FCC will be limited to forcing 
selected license owners to open access to retail entry. Doubtlessly the vertically integrated 
networks will offer solutions for many retail customers, but we emphasize that competition from 
new retail providers using the open access network will force incumbents to improve their 
services and lower prices.  
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